When …rms in the same industry located in di¤erent regions or countries experience shocks to production costs in their respective industries that are imperfectly correlated, arbitrage opportunities automatically lead to trade. Trade can either stabilize or destabilize the price faced by producers in a given country. Producers' surplus is a¤ected due to the "variance-covariance" e¤ect, while consumers' surplus is more directly a¤ected through the variance of the product price. The paper examines how consumers' surplus, producers' surplus and social welfare are a¤ected when the regions switch from autarky to free trade in the presence of industry and region-speci…c cost shocks. Contrary to Anderson et al. (1989) and MonerColonques (1998), under Cournot competition, when the industries are symmetric in the two regions, producers' surplus can increase in both regions in the switch from autarky to trade. In general, depending on the variance of the cost shocks in the two regions, the correlation coe¢cient between the shocks, and the number of …rms, producers' and consumers' surplus in a given country can be either higher or lower under trade compared to autarky. However, social welfare is higher in both regions under a surprisingly robust set of conditions. Contrary to traditional trade theory, the gain in social welfare in several situations is due to the gains in producers' surplus o¤setting the loss in consumers' surplus.
Introduction
Traditional trade theory implies that one of the major bene…ts associated with the movement of goods between regions is due to greater specialization in accordance with the principle of comparative advantage. Recent trade theory, on the other hand, notes that a large volume of trade takes place between regions with similar resource endowments and is intra-industry in nature. Intra-industry trade is explained in terms of increasing returns to scale, and one of the main bene…ts of intra-industry trade is greater product variety enjoyed by consumers.
In this paper, we analyze the welfare consequences of intra-industry trade between regions when the regions are subject to imperfectly correlated production or cost shocks.
Examples of such shocks could be weather uncertainties a¤ecting agriculture and agrobased industries, interruptions in supply such as the recent power outages in California, labor disputes, changes in commodity tax rates, oil price shocks, and, for countries, exchange rate changes that a¤ect the cost of imported inputs, or macro-economic shocks that a¤ect wages and prices in the economy.
Trade between regions would occur in the presence of these shocks for a simple reason: imperfectly correlated regional shocks would result in price di¤erentials in local markets which present arbitrage opportunities. Goods would move from regions with low prices to those with high prices and in the process reduce the price divergence between regions.
Somewhat surprisingly, the welfare consequences of such arbitrage have not received much attention in the trade literature. One notable exception is Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) , who argue that trade motivated by such arbitrage opportunities can be Pareto inferior if both producers (farmers in their model) and consumers are risk-averse.
For Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) , the focus was the e¤ect of stabilization policies on the welfare of farmers and the assumption of risk-aversion is very reasonable in that context. However, when manufacturing …rms in the same industry in di¤erent regions are subject to shocks which a¤ect all …rms in the industry in the same region but not in the other region (i.e. the shocks are industry and region-speci…c), then risk-neutrality may be a better assumption. The shareholders of the …rms should be able to diversify away the shocks that are speci…c to their industries and therefore can be treated as e¤ectively risk-neutral. One then has to address the welfare issues from this standpoint. 1 Existing empirical evidence shows that price di¤erentials dissipate reasonably quickly within regions in the same country, but not so across borders (see, for example, Parsley and Wei (1996) for evidence on the speed of convergence of prices in U.S. cities, and Engel and Rogers (1996) for the so-called "border e¤ect" between prices in U.S. and Canadian cities across the U.S.-Canada border). The reasons for the border-e¤ect are not very well understood as yet; however, we believe that it is important to ask the normative question as to whether market integration -if it could be achieved -is desirable, and what its possible impact might be on consumers and producers of the regions. It is also important to note that price convergence has been a key issue surrounding the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The President of the European Central Bank stated recently:
Price level convergence could be expected to take place in the euro area for at least two reasons. First, the completion of the internal market and increased cross-border price transparency contribute to eroding the scope for the existence of substantial price di¤erentials for products which are easily tradable across borders. To a large extent, this may have taken place already before the start of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but di¤erences remain. One example of such a price convergence that has attracted public attention relates to car prices. Secondly, with regard to goods and services which are less easily tradable across national borders (such as housing and hairdressing), the long-term convergence of productivity and living standards across the euro area would create a tendency towards price level convergence. selling their products in foreign markets. However, they also face greater competition from the output of …rms in the other region. Anderson et al. (1989) …nd that in general, the total pro…ts of …rms from at least one region will decrease, and if the regional markets are symmetric, …rms in both regions will attain lower pro…ts. Moner-Colonques (1998), like us, introduces cost uncertainty. Each …rm has a cost shock that is private information to that …rm, and knows the distribution from which other …rms' cost shocks are drawn.
Moner-Colonques (1998) …nds that if the variance of the cost shock is su¢ciently high, …rms from one of the regions will bene…t. However, it is never possible, in the symmetric case, for …rms in both regions to bene…t.
Our model di¤ers from Anderson et al. (1989) in that these authors do not consider uncertainty. It has two main di¤erences with Moner-Colonques (1998), who considers idiosyncratic shocks that are private information of the …rms. 3 First, we assume that …rms within the same region experience the same shock, but these shocks are imperfectly correlated across regions. Second, we do not assume that the shocks are private information -in fact, the shocks are assumed to be common knowledge and the output decisions are taken after the shocks are realized. We …nd that in the symmetric case, as long as the cost shocks across regions are not perfectly correlated, a su¢ciently high variance of the shock would increase the pro…ts of …rms in both regions under trade (or market integration) 4 compared to autarky. This is di¤erent from the results of both Anderson et al. (1989) as well as Moner-Colonques (1998). Moreover, unlike these two papers, we also carry out a full welfare analysis. In the symmetric case, social welfare improves from market integration in both regions. If the regions have unequal variances of the shocks, then if the shocks are highly correlated, and the variance of the shocks is su¢ciently high, social welfare may be lower for the region with the lower variance of the shock. However, social welfare must be higher in at least one region.
To understand the way in which trade can change the exposure to uncertainty faced by producers and consumers and thus a¤ect their welfare, it is useful to consider a situation in which the …rms are price takers. Accordingly, our analysis begins with the case of price-taking …rms. In the absence of trade, the cost shocks induce variability in the industry price. We show that the impact of variability of price on expected pro…t can be decomposed into two terms: the variance of price, which a¤ects the expected pro…t of …rms positively, and the covariance of the price with the cost shock faced by the …rm, which a¤ects its expected pro…t negatively. Trade a¤ects the variability of the price as the price is now a function of the cost shocks of both regions. However, trade also reduces the covariance between the price and a …rm's own cost shock. Trade a¤ects the welfare of consumers more directly because the indirect utility function of consumers is quasi-convex in prices, so that consumers prefer a more variable price to a less variable one. We …nd Finally, we conclude in section 5. Some of the detailed derivations are relegated to the appendix.
The Basic Model
We consider two countries 5 , Home and Foreign, which are characterized by an identical number of …rms, n, producing a homogeneous product. Each domestic …rm has the following cost function:
Similarly, each foreign …rm has the following cost function:
w and w ¤ are two random variables representing cost shocks with E(w) = E(w ¤ ) = 0,
, and Corr(w; w ¤ ) = ½. Production takes place after w and w ¤ are realized. The demand for the good in both the Home country and the Foreign country is given by
The basic reason why trade a¤ects welfare in this environment is that it a¤ects the exposure of producers and consumers to uncertainty. Let us go one step back and try to understand …rst how the producers and consumers react to the exposure to uncertainty.
Since the shocks a¤ect the marginal costs of …rms, equilibrium price also depends on the realization of the cost shocks, p = p(w): 6 Given w; the consumers' surplus is
and its expected value is
Thus, expected consumers' surplus increases with the variance of price, that is, consumers prefer the price to be more variable, and decreases with the expected price.
The e¤ect of cost uncertainty on an individual producer's expected pro…t is not that straightforward; there is a trade-o¤ between the impact of the variability of price and that of the covariance of price with the cost shock. Given w; the expressions for pro…ts of an individual producer under price-taking behavior and under Cournot competition are
respectively. 7 So the expressions for expected pro…ts are 6 Without loss of generality, we develop the argument from the point of view of the Home country. 7 The expression for ¼j Price-taking is derived in section 3. To derive the expression for ¼j Cournot ; note that the ith …rm's problem is: Maximize
The …rst-order condition for this problem is: a ¡ b(
Using this we can write
Finally, we use the …rst-order condition again to get the expression for pro…t:
Clearly, expected pro…t of an individual producer increases with the variance of price but decreases with the covariance between the price and the cost shock. For future reference we call this trade-o¤ between the e¤ects of cost shock on producer's expected pro…t the "variance-covariance e¤ect". The expected pro…t is also increasing in the expected price.
A move from autarky to trade a¤ects the welfare of consumers and producers and hence the social welfare as the variability and comovements of price (with the cost shock)
are now a¤ected since the price now depends on the cost shocks of both countries. We analyze these e¤ects under alternative assumptions about the market structure in the following two sections.
Price-Taking Firms
We …rst consider the case in which the …rms are price takers. Consider autarky …rst.
Given w, the equilibrium in the Home country requires marginal cost to equal price, and the equality of demand and supply, that is,
Solving for p yields
Given w, the equilibrium pro…t of a …rm is
Thus, the expected pro…t is
Also, given w, the consumers' surplus is
and therefore the expected consumers' surplus is
Thus, the expected social welfare is
Now, consider trade. Given w and w ¤ , the equilibrium requires
Given w and w ¤ , the equilibrium pro…t of a domestic …rm is
Substituting for p, we get the expected pro…t from trade to be
The following proposition now follows from equation (4) and is proved in Appendix A.1. Proposition 1.
1. The gain in expected producers' surplus under trade is decreasing in ½ for both countries.
2.
For any value of ½; the expected producers' surplus is higher under trade than under autarky for the country with the higher variance of the cost shock.
surplus is higher under trade than under autarky for …rms in both countries.
surplus is higher under trade than under autarky for …rms in both countries if either
the gain in expected producers' surplus under trade is increasing in
We shall discuss these results in more detail later, but for now, some comments are in order. First, it is worth pointing out that the upper bound on ½ in Proposition 1.3
is increasing in the number of …rms in each country, n, so that the higher the number of …rms, the more likely it is that …rms in both countries will bene…t from the opening of trade. Secondly, the upper bound rapidly approaches 1 as n increases (for example, for n = 5, the value of the upper bound (with¯= b = 1) is already 0:918); so that the condition is actually not very restrictive for price-taking industries with a large number of …rms.
Given w and w ¤ , the consumers' surplus under trade is
8 x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 and x 4 are de…ned in Appendix A.1. Note that bn
4¯+ bn bn ; and x 1 x 4 = 1; and x 2 x 3 = 1:
Substituting for p, we get the expected consumers' surplus to be
We can now draw the following conclusion about consumers' surplus using equation (5) (the proof is developed in Appendix A.2).
Proposition 2.
1. The loss in expected consumers' surplus under trade is decreasing in ½ for both countries.
for both countries, the expected consumers' surplus is lower under trade than under autarky. 9 Otherwise, under trade, the expected consumers' surplus is lower for the country with the higher variance of the cost shock, and higher for the country with the lower variance of the cost shock. Notice that the gap between the lower and upper bounds on
is decreasing in ½ and is zero for ½ = 1: In other words, as the correlation between the shocks increases, it becomes more likely that at least one of the countries' consumers will bene…t from trade. However, it is never the case that consumers of both countries will bene…t, that is, even in the limit, when ½ = 1; consumers of the country with the higher variance of the cost shock are worse o¤ with trade. 9 Note that
10 To be precise, when
the expected consumers' surplus under trade is higher for the Home country and lower for the Foreign country, and the situation reverses when
Finally, consider social welfare. The expected social welfare under trade is
Proposition 3 summarizes the result on social welfare that follows from equation (6) .
Proposition 3.
1. Social welfare is higher under trade than autarky for both the Home and the Foreign country for any value of the parameters ¾; ¾ ¤ or ½, and the increase in social welfare under trade is decreasing in the correlation coe¢cient ½ for both countries.
For the case of identical variances, we know from Propositions 1 and 2 that producers in both countries are better o¤ with trade, while consumers are worse o¤. Proposition 3, however, says that social welfare improves in both countries. This perhaps best highlights one major di¤erence of our analysis from traditional trade theory, where, under perfect competition, the gains from trade are driven primarily by gains to consumers. In our setting, gains from trade can accrue to the producers and outweigh the loss to consumers.
The intuition for these propositions can be understood as follows. To begin with note that the expected price in equilibrium does not change due to the move from autarky to trade:
The e¤ect of trade on consumers' surplus is relatively straightforward. We know from equation (1) that, expected price remaining the same, consumers' surplus increases with the variance of price. With trade the variance of price for the country with higher variance under autarky clearly goes down, and hence the consumers of this country are worse o¤ with trade. However, the variance of price for the country with lower variance under autarky may increase, especially if the correlation between the shocks is high, so that consumers in this country may be better o¤ after trade. Recall that the gap between the bounds on ¾ ¾ ¤ in Proposition 2.2 tends to zero as ½ tends to 1, so that consumers in one of the countries will be better o¤ in the limit if the variances are unequal.
Consider the producers next. Recall the "variance-covariance e¤ect" demonstrated in section 2. Risk-neutral …rms like the mean-preserving increase in price variability. Trade may increase or decrease price variability depending on whether the country has a lower or higher variance under autarky as noted in the last paragraph. However, because the shock is a common shock to all …rms in the same industry in the same country, in industry equilibrium, the industry price follows the cost shock. This covariance between the price and the cost shock a¤ects the expected pro…t of the …rms negatively. Trade a¤ects the covariance by making the price sensitive not only to the own country shock, but also to the shock in the other country.
Note that
Cov(pj Trade ; w) ¡ Cov(pj Autarky ; w) = 1 2
To illustrate the opposing impacts of the variability of price and the covariance of price with the cost shock when a country moves from autarky to trade, consider …rst the
Clearly, trade decreases price variability resulting in a lower consumers' surplus and producer's pro…t. On the other hand, trade reduces the covariance of price with the cost shock which has a positive e¤ect on the producer's pro…t.
From equation (2), to determine the impact of the switch from autarky to trade on expected producers' surplus, it is enough to look at the change in V ar(p) ¡ 2Cov(p) (since the expected price, E(p); remains unchanged). It is immediate from the above two
This explains why producers' surplus must increase for both countries for the case of equal variances. Now, suppose that, holding ¾ ¤ …xed, ¾ is increased from the initial value of ¾ = ¾ ¤ : It is easy to check that the above inequality will continue to hold for the Home country, which implies that Home country producers will be better o¤ in the switch from autarky to trade.
Finally, to understand the impact on social welfare, it is enough to examine equation (6) . It is clear from equation (6) that social welfare must be necessarily higher for both countries under trade.
Cournot Competition
In this section, we assume that the …rms are Cournot competitors. A substantial literature has been developed to address the issues of trade, gains from trade and optimal trade policies when …rms operate under strategic environments. 11 But whether individual rival …rms from two separate countries themselves bene…t from a move from autarky to free trade has not received much attention until recently. Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) consider a deterministic environment and show that producers' surplus in oligopolistic autarkic industries would be lower under trade due to the "market expansion e¤ect". Roughly, trade or market expansion causes …rms to expand output because with integrated markets, the demand curve facing the …rms is ‡atter when they can serve both markets, thereby raising marginal revenue at a given (symmetric) level of output. 12 Our framework di¤ers in that we have uncertainty a¤ecting the marginal cost of production.
The analysis of the previous section (the "variance-covariance e¤ect" in particular) sug- 
Thus, unlike price-taking behavior, expected price decreases (and hence output increases) due to a move from autarky to free trade under strategic behavior. This is the source of the "market expansion e¤ect". Clearly, producers are worse-o¤ due to this e¤ect whereas the consumers are better-o¤.
Do Individual Firms Bene…t From Trade?
In this subsection we address the question whether individual rival …rms from two separate countries themselves bene…t from a move from autarky to free trade. Using equation (3) (and noting that b = 1; and¯= 0) we can decompose the gains from trade for individual …rms as follows:
oi :
13 Note that we cannot assume¯= 0 when the …rms are price takers. The expected pro…ts of the …rms are then zero under all circumstances. But this problem does not arise when the …rms are Cournot competitors.
The decomposition shows the two o¤setting e¤ects of free trade at work -the …rst term on the right-hand-side is the "market expansion e¤ect" and the second one is the "variancecovariance e¤ect". What happens to the gains from trade for individual …rms depend on the relative magnitudes of these two e¤ects. Using the speci…cations of the model we can
It is easy to identify that the …rst term involving no uncertainty parameters captures the "market expansion e¤ect" while the second term is the "variance-covariance e¤ect". Note that the "market expansion e¤ect" is negative, that is, individual …rm's expected pro…t decreases under trade. Anderson et al. (1989) arrives at a similar conclusion under a deterministic environment. But, under cost uncertainty, we have the additional e¤ect -the "variance-covariance e¤ect" -which can be positive and can dominate the negative "market expansion e¤ect".
Since we are interested in …nding conditions when …rms of both the Home and Foreign countries bene…t from trade, let us express their gains in expected producers' surplus in the following way:
and (2n + 1) 
14 For a given ¾ ¾ ¤ ; de…ne,
¾ ¤´> 0 and the amount of uncertainty is su¢ciently high such that
then …rms of both countries bene…t from trade. Proposition 4 summarizes this conclusion:
Proposition 4. When the …rms are Cournot competitors, the expected producers' surplus of both Home and Foreign …rms are higher under trade than under autarky if ei-
2 2 (n + 1) 4 and, for a given
or (ii)
and, for a given
Notice that the upper bound on ½ 2 in part (i) of the Proposition is increasing in n, and for n = 1, has a value of 0:718 (i.e., the condition holds for j½j < 0:8488). However, since the numerator and denominator of the lower bound on ¾ 2 both depend on n, we cannot immediately conclude that the condition is more likely to hold if n is larger.
We can get more precise conditions if we further assume that the variances of the cost shocks are identical: ¾ = ¾ ¤ = ¹ ¾: Then the expected gain from trade becomes
14 z 1 and z 4 are de…ned in Appendix A.3.
The following proposition now follows from equation (9). 
It turns out that the expressions in the right hand side of Proposition 5 (i) decreases slightly as n goes from n = 1 to n = 2;and then increase monotonically with n. Exactly the opposite is true for the expression in the right hand side of Proposition 5 (ii), which increases from n = 1 to n = 2, and then decreases monotonically in n. Thus, in the symmetric case, as the number of …rms in each industry increases beyond the duopoly case of n = 2, it is more likely that …rms in both countries will bene…t from the switch to trade.
Propositions 4 and 5 thus identify the precise conditions when the "variance-covariance
e¤ect" is positive and dominates the negative "market expansion e¤ect" so that the expected pro…ts of individual …rms is higher under trade than under autarky for both Home and Foreign …rms.
It is interesting to compare our …ndings with that of Moner-Colonques (1998). He shows that in the presence of private cost information, the expected pro…t of an oligopolistic …rm is higher under free trade than under autarky when there exists a su¢ciently large amount of uncertainty and a certain degree of …rms' heterogeneity. We do not need any asymmetry of information for our result. We also need uncertainty to be su¢ciently large, but that is to strengthen the "variance-covariance e¤ect", which is quite intuitive.
Interestingly, in Moner-Colonques' analysis, the …rms of at least one country prefer to operate under autarky rather than under free trade, for the particular case of symmetry both in demand and industry sizes, whereas this symmetric case is precisely what we have considered in Proposition 5.
Gains in Consumers' Surplus and Social Welfare
Now we analyze the e¤ect of trade on consumers' surplus and social welfare. Consider consumers' surplus …rst. From equation (1) it is clear that gains in consumers' surplus depend on the relative magnitudes of the "market expansion e¤ect" and the e¤ect of price variability on consumers' surplus. Using the model speci…cations we get the expression for the gain in consumers' surplus as
The …rst term represents the e¤ect of market expansion and the second term captures the impact of price variability. Not surprisingly, market expansion and the associated increase in production tends to increase the consumers' surplus. However, trade may reduce the variance of price and the o¤setting e¤ect of lower price variability tends to lower consumers' surplus. Proposition 6 summarizes the results for gains in consumers'
surplus that follow from equation (10) and is proved in Appendix A.4.
Proposition 6. When the …rms are Cournot competitors,
1.
The expected consumers' surplus is lower under trade than under autarky for both countries if and only if ½ < 2n 2 ¡ 1 2(n + 1) 2 ; s < ¾ ¾ ¤ < s ¤ (that is, ¾ is su¢ciently close to ¾ ¤15 ) and, for a given 
where i is the index for the country with the higher variance of the cost shock. Several comments are in order. First, from Proposition 6.1, the value of ½ necessary for consumers' surplus to increase following trade in at least one country is not high for the monopoly or the duopoly cases (the upper bound is 0:389 for n = 2). However, when the correlation is close to zero (or negative) , and the variances are similar in magnitude and su¢ciently high, consumers' surplus will decrease in both countries with the switch from autarky to trade. Finally, holding the variance of one of the countries (say the Home country) unchanged, as the variance of the Foreign country increases su¢ciently, consumers' surplus will increase in the home country but decrease in the foreign country.
Once again, the conditions can be made more precise when ¾ = ¾ ¤ = ¹ ¾: In that case, the gain in consumers' surplus from trade is
Now we can draw the following conclusion that follows from equation (11) . The expected social welfare gain under trade is
Like producers' surplus and consumers' surplus, social welfare gain also is a¤ected by the two e¤ects of market expansion and price variability. It is clear from equation (12) Proposition 8.
The expected social welfare gain is monotonically decreasing in ½ for both countries.
2.
For any value of ½; social welfare under trade is higher for the country with the higher variance of the cost shock.
3. For any value of ½; social welfare under trade is higher for both countries if either
n + 5 4n + 1 :
2 ; the expected social welfare under trade is higher for both countries.
2 ; the expected social welfare under trade is higher for both countries if either ¾ is su¢ciently close to
. 18 Otherwise, the expected social welfare under trade is higher for the country with the higher variance of the cost shock, and it is higher for the country with the lower variance of the cost shock if, for a given
where i is the index for the country with the lower variance of the cost shock. 
and (ii) for the Foreign country if
Notice that unless the shocks are highly correlated, the condition in Proposition 8.4 is not going to be met The minimum value of the upper bound occurs for n = 3 and is 0: 995:
Even when this condition is met, for social welfare to decrease, the ratio of the variance of the shocks must not be very close to or very far away from 1, and the variances must be su¢ciently high. It is also clear from the conditions on t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ; t 4 and Proposition 8.6
that both countries cannot be worse o¤ from trade.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that trade can a¤ect the welfare of countries in the presence of arbitrage opportunities as it a¤ects the exposure of the countries to uncertainty. Producers' surplus is a¤ected due to the "variance-covariance" e¤ect. Consumers are also a¤ected as the variability of product prices changes. Depending on the variances of the shocks, the correlation between the shocks and the number of …rms, producers' and consumers' surplus in a given country can be either higher or lower with trade than under autarky. However, social welfare is higher in both countries under a surprisingly robust set of conditions, both when the …rms are price-takers or Cournot competitors.
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider a Home country …rm …rst. Equation (4) can be rewritten as
Consider the quadratic expression
This expression is strictly convex in ¾ ¾ ¤ and its minimum value is
: It follows that, for a Home country …rm, E(¼j
When ½ 2¸4 bn(4¯+ bn) (4¯+ 2bn) 2 ; (A.1) can be expressed as
where
2(4¯+ bn) and
It is easy to check that bn 4¯+ bn ·
Now consider a Foreign …rm. By symmetry, it follows from equation (4) that
This expression is also strictly convex in ¾ ¾ ¤ with a minimum value of
: Thus, for a Foreign …rm also E(¼j Trade ) > E(¼j Autarky )
When ½ 2¸4 bn(4¯+ bn) (4¯+ 2bn) 2 ; (A.2) can be expressed as
2bn and 
; otherwise, when From equation (5) it follows that
For the Foreign country we can similarly show that
where y 3 = ¡½ ¡ p ½ 2 + 3; and
Now Proposition 2.2 follows. ¥
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4.
We have
¾ ¤´a re strictly convex in ¾ ¾ ¤ ; and their minimum values are
and
¾ ¤´a re strictly positive when Using equation (10) we can express the gains in consumers' surplus for the Home and the Foreign country as follows:
2(2n + 1) 2 (n + 1) When ½ 2¸1 ¡ (n ¡ 2) (2n + 1) 
